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Introduction 
 In recent years, intense public scrutiny has surrounded the phenomenon of reverse 
leveraged buyouts (RLBOs), or initial public offerings (IPOs) of firms that had 
previously been bought out by professional later-stage private equity investors. This 
paper seeks to understand the long-run performance of these offerings, in order to 
understand whether these concerns are justified. 
 
To date, much of the discussion of these offerings has focused on a few troubled 
RLBOs, such as Refco, which Thomas H. Lee Partners bought a majority stake in for 
more than $500 million in 2004 and took the company public at more than double the 
price a year later. In one of the more than a dozen lawsuits filed after the collapse of the 
firm soon after its IPO, the plaintiffs asserted “there are substantial questions to be 
answered concerning the structure, cost and effects of the investment in Refco by Thomas 
H. Lee Partners in June of 2004, and Refco's IPO in August of 2005."2  
 
More generally, observers have argued that buyout groups push overleveraged 
companies too quickly into the public market. For instance, the New York Times (Sorkin, 
2005) observed: 
[S]everal high-profile quick flips have left critics wondering whether 
buyout firms were using such offerings simply to line their pockets, rather 
than using the proceeds to support companies. Earlier [in 2005], the 
Blackstone Group sold a German chemicals company, the Celanese 
Corporation, to the public after owning it for less than 12 months. The 
firm quadrupled its money and all of the proceeds from the offering were 
used to pay out a special dividend to Blackstone. Mr. Kravis's firm, 
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company, also quadrupled its money by 
flipping PanAmSat, the satellite company it owned for less than a year. 
A recent Wall Street Journal article on RLBOs (Cowan, 2006) noted that “while some 
debt is fine, when it is taken on to finance things that only benefit some shareholders—
such as special dividends—new investors are buying hobbled companies.” 
 
                                                 
2http://lbo.djnewsletters.com/exclusives.asp?s=DEALBOOK&sid=NIQPOPOQMHI 
(accessed May 22, 2006).  
But it is plausible to wonder whether buyout groups would find such a strategy 
productive. Buyout groups typically hold large equity ownership in firms prior to their 
IPOs, and continue to retain large ownership stakes subsequent to the offerings. Thus, the 
post-IPO long-run performance of RLBOs will have substantial wealth implications for 
the private equity investors. More importantly, as repeated players in IPO market, buyout 
groups will suffer reputation losses if its RLBOs turn out to be failures. 
 
These discussions suggest the desirability of a systematic look at the long-run 
performance of RLBOs. Surprisingly, these offerings have attracted little attention in the 
academic literature in recent years, despite the considerable attention devoted to the 
performance of venture capital-backed IPOs (Brav and Gompers, 1997; Gompers and 
Lerner, 1999; Hamao, Packer, and Ritter, 1999; Jain and Kini, 2000; Masulis and Li, 
2005; and many others). 
 
Several papers in the earlier literature, however, are quite relevant to this one. 
First, there is a literature on the evolution of LBOs.  Kaplan (1992) examined 183 large 
leveraged buyouts executed between 1979 and 1986, and documented that a significant 
fraction of firms undergoing LBOs went public once again: the RLBOs in his sample 
remained private for a median time of 6.82 years. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990) 
examined 72 RLBOs between 1983 and 1987, and documented substantial increases in 
profitability and temporary increases in leverage when compared to the same firms prior 
to the LBO.  
 
Most relevant are four studies. DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993), examining 62 
RLBOs between 1983 and 1987 (though much of the analysis is based on a smaller 
sample), find that the accounting performance of these firms exceeds their peers prior to 
going public, and then deteriorates thereafter. They find no evidence, however, that these 
offerings’ stock prices underperform the market. Holthausen and Larcker (1996) examine 
90 RLBOs between 1983 and 1988, and argue that there is no evidence of either poor 
performance when either accounting or stock market measures are employed. Chou, 
Gombola and Liu study the earning management around RLBOs and find positive and 
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significant discretionary current accruals coincident with offerings of RLBOs. Finally, 
Mian and Rosenfeld (1993) examine 85 RLBOs over roughly the same period and find 
that the offerings slightly outperform their stock market peers. 
 
The absence of scrutiny of RLBOs since the 1980s is especially striking due to the 
changes in the market since these years. As discussed in the next section of the paper, the 
buyout market of the 1990s and 2000s is very different from that of the 1980s, both in 
terms of the amount of capital deployed and the degree of competitiveness of these 
transactions. It is natural to ask whether the earlier patterns still characterize this market. 
 
This analysis also provides an opportunity to understand the drivers of cross-
sectional differences in RLBO performance. The modest number of offerings studied 
limited the ability of earlier authors to draw systematic conclusions about the 
considerations that made RLBOs particularly successful.  
 
 In this paper, we examine 496 RLBOs between 1980 and 2002. The following 
conclusions emerge from the analysis: 
• RLBOs appear to consistently outperform other IPOs and the market as a whole. 
The positive returns appear to be economically and statistically meaningful. 
• No evidence of a deterioration of returns appears over time, despite the growth of 
the buyout market. RLBOs performed strongly in the late 1980s, the mid 1990s 
(less consistently), and the 2000s. 
• RLBOs sharply outperform the market in the first, fourth, and fifth year after 
going public; performance in other years is more ambiguous. 
• Much of the outperformance seems associated with the larger RLBOs, but this 
may be driven by the apparently superior returns of RLBOs by groups with more 
capital under management at the time of the offering.  
• There is no evidence that more leveraged RLBOs perform more poorly than their 
peers. 
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The plan of this paper is as follows. Section 1 briefly reviews the evolution of the 
leveraged buyout market since the 1980s. In Section 2, we discuss the construction of the 
data-set employed in the study. Section 3 presents the basic analyses of long-run 
performance. Several supplemental analyses examining cross-sectional differences in 
RLBO returns are discussed in Section 4. The final section concludes the paper. 
 
1. The Evolution of the Leveraged Buyout Market 
During the 1980s, the U.S. buyout industry was comprised of a relatively small 
number of organizations.  These groups identified transactions through personal contacts 
with executives in key industries and various intermediaries. When they identified a 
transaction, they would often have weeks or months to analyze the proposed deal. They 
would then structure the transaction using high degrees of leverage: often as much as 
85% or 90% of the total purchase price would be in the form of debt.  As a result, even a 
modest increase in the value of the firm—which could be due to the overall growth in the 
stock market, inflation, and operating improvements—would lead to substantial profits 
for the equity-holders.   
 
As Kaplan (1997) notes: 
In the first half of the 1980s, the LBO insights led to great success. As 
documented in Kaplan (1989) and Kaplan and Stein (1993), buyout 
companies experienced improved operating profits and few defaults. 
Adjusting for the overall stock market or industry, these early buyouts 
generated abnormally positive returns. Because the overall stock market 
increased over this period, buyout sponsors earned substantial nominal 
returns. 
 
Subsequent years have more challenging for buyout groups. The buyout industry today is 
far larger than it was during the years when it enjoyed its greatest returns.  Fundraising by 
U.S. buyout funds was six times greater in 1998 than it was in 1987, and by 2005, it was 
nine times the level in 1987.  
 
At the same time, the returns from these investments deteriorated. For instance, 
while average buyout fund established between 1980 and 1985 earned a rate of return of 
47%, those established between 1986 and 1999 earned an average IRR of slightly less 
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than 10%.3  This observation is corroborated by a correlation analysis, which shows a 
very strong negative correlation between fundraising and returns in private equity.4
 
Most observers attributed the deterioration of returns as capital under 
management has increased to increased competition for transactions. Over time, there 
were increasingly fewer opportunities to buy companies at relatively low prices without 
competition. Sellers of firms—having become aware of the numerous potential buyers—
increasingly hired investment banks, who conducted auctions between leveraged buyout 
groups. As a result of the increased competition, buyers were  required to pay more for 
transactions. Auctions also had another, less direct cost: that of “dry holes.”  When 
assessing a proposed transaction arranged through close contacts where there is only one 
private equity group involved, the general partners can be confident that if they decide to 
go ahead with the transaction, they will be able to complete the transaction.  In an auction 
where there are a dozen or more groups bidding, the dynamics are very different.  Even if 
it wants to undertake the transaction, the private equity group has a low probability of 
success.  Hence, the risks are much greater in this scenario. 
 
These changing dynamics have been widely recognized by sophisticated 
practitioners. For instance, Rick Rickertsen of Thayer Capital commented in 2001: 
Capital has always been a commodity, but never has it been more plentiful 
than it is today.  Have management availability and expertise been 
growing at the same rate?  Very unlikely.  This means the ratio of capital 
to expertise is increasing dramatically. 
 
It might be anticipated that these changes would have affected the market performance of 
RLBOs as well, if, as press accounts suggested, competitive pressures were leading firms 
to take more marginal and more leveraged firms public. 
 
                                                 
3These calculations are based on the VentureXpert database 
(http://vx.thomsonib.com/NASApp/VxComponent/VXMain.jsp, accessed May 23, 2006). Returns are 
computed as of December 31, 2005. Data are continuously updated, and therefore subject to change. 
  
4The correlation coefficient between the leveraged buyout fundraising and the average returns from 1980 to 
2002 is -0.67. Because Venture Economics only reports aggregated data for the returns of buyout funds in 
vintages years 1980 through 1983, we use the average annual fundraising in this period in the correlation 
analysis.  
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 2. Data 
We sought to build as comprehensive a collection of RLBOs between 1980 and 
2002 as possible. We chose the former cut-off date because the earlier literature suggests 
that there were essentially no such offerings previously. We employed the latter date to 
ensure that we had at least three years of performance data for each offering.  
   
A. Identifying the RLBO Sample 
One of the main barriers to research in this area is the identification and 
characterization of the RLBOs. The difficulty in identifying the buyout-backed IPOs 
arises from two factors. 
• The first is the secretive nature of buyout organizations. Unlike venture capital 
organizations, these groups rarely disclose new investments on web sites or in 
press releases. As a result, the coverage of the major databases is considerably 
less complete than that of venture-backed transactions.  
• Another complication comes from the fact that the boundaries between venture 
capital and buyout investments are increasingly blurred. For example, private 
equity firms that typically make buyout investments have in the past decade also 
often made venture capital type of investments. Hence, one cannot infer the deal 
type by just looking at the attributes of the investors. This gives rise to ambiguity 
in identifying the Reverse Leveraged Buyouts among the private equity-backed 
IPOs.  
 
Since we wish to understand the performance of RLBO transactions, we choose to 
eliminate transactions that are ambiguous. In particular, we insist that the transactions 
satisfy two criteria: 
• That the financing was undertaken by a buyout group. We compile a list of 
buyout firms/funds that primarily engage in buyout activities from VentureXpert 
and Capital IQ. Any IPOs that are not backed by at least one organization on this 
list was regarded as non-buyout backed and eliminated from the sample. 
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• That the investment was characterized by the use of leverage. To help screen out 
investments by buyout organizations that more closely resemble venture capital, 
we search press accounts via the Factiva, as well as financial sponsor home pages 
and SEC filings, to understand the features of the transaction. 
 
We identify RLBOs from several sources. The first of these is Securities Data 
Company’s (SDC) Corporate New Issues database. The database flags IPOs with an 
identifier indicating that it had previously conducted a leveraged buyout. This gives us a 
sample of 229 RLBOs for the period from 1980 through the middle of 1998. SDC, 
however, does not flag any  RLBOs after 1998. Moreover, it appeared that the list was 
incomplete in earlier years. 
 
The second approach was to search databases of LBOs, and seek to identify 
whether any transactions subsequently went public. RLBOs were determined by 
examining both the entries in the databases indicating the outcomes of the transactions 
(which are frequently incomplete), as well as through our own searches of news stories 
and the SDC Corporate New Issues database. To do this, we employed SDC’s 
VentureXpert and SDC Mergers and Acquisitions databases, as well as Standard and 
Poors’ Capital IQ. While the Capital IQ database is more comprehensive, it only extends 
back to 1998. In each case, the databases identify a large number of transactions that 
could be better characterized as venture capital investments, which we eliminate using 
the criteria described above. These three sources generate an additional 267 RLBOs, 
leaving us with a final sample of 496.  
 
Table 1 presents the distribution of the sample by year. It highlights the increase 
in RLBO activity in the 1990s and the 2000s. It also highlights that the level of RLBO 
activity remains modest (at least until the final two years of the sample) in relation to that 
of LBOs, venture capital-backed IPOs and that of IPOs as whole: overall, only 8% of the 
IPOs by number and 13% of the IPOs by market value between 1980 and 2002 are 
RLBOs. In total, the number of RLBOs represent 13% of the LBOs conducted during this 
period. While almost 150 private equity groups are represented, the bulk of the offerings 
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are by well-known groups such as Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts, Forstmann Little, Citicorp 
Venture Capital, T.H. Lee, and Warburg Pincus.  
 
Despite our efforts to be as comprehensive as possible, our sample may be subject 
to potential selection effects. Large and visible RLBOs are more likely to be included in 
the sample due to the fact that the buyout groups’ attempts at secrecy are less effective 
here. Although one cannot check ex post whether the sample used in this work is 
representative of the universe of RLBOs or not, we did two “sanity checks.” First, we 
asked several buyout firms to check whether our sample includes all the RLBOs that they 
have backed in practice. Second, we compared our sample those used in the existing 
literature to see whether it is consistent. Our sample performed well in the above two 
checks.           
    
B. Supplemental Data  
 In addition, we use a variety of data on private equity returns in this study. This is 
drawn from the databases of the Center for Research into Security Pricing (CRSP) with 
the following exceptions: 
• Benchmarks based on industry and size and book-to-market matched (5 X 5) 
portfolios are taken from Kenneth French’s website 
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html).5  
• The benchmark of non-buyout backed IPOs is based on the SDC Corporate New 
Issues database, which reports 11,004 IPOs from 1980 through 2002. After 
eliminating American Depository Receipts, Real Estate Investment Trusts, closed-
end funds, unit offerings, and spin-offs, as well as IPOs with an offering size 
smaller than $1.5 million, firm assets less than $5 million, or an offering price of 
                                                 
5French’s website contains a detailed description of the industry portfolio’s construction. The 5 X 5 
portfolios, which are constructed at the end of each June, are the intersections of five portfolios formed on 
market capitalization and five portfolios formed on the ratio of book equity to market equity. The size 
breakpoints for year t are the NYSE market equity quintiles at the end of that June. The book-to-market for 
June of year t is the book equity for the last fiscal year end in t-1 divided by market capitalization for 
December of t-1. The BE/ME breakpoints are NYSE quintiles. All firms that have issued equity in the 
previous five years in either an IPO or a seasoned equity offering are not included.  
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under $5 per share, we have a final sample (including the 496 RLBOs) of 6,202 
IPOs, of which 5,265 are listed in CRSP.  
• The lead underwriters of all IPOs were identified from SDC Corporate New 
Issues database. (We also obtain from this database other information on the 
characteristics of the firm prior to the IPOs, such as assets and leverage.) The 
corresponding underwriter reputation measures are from Jay Ritter’ website 
(http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm), which are in turn based on Carter and 
Manaster (1990) and subsequent papers. 
In addition, for our returns analysis, we require the RLBOs to be listed in CRSP, which 
reduces our sample to 428 RLBOs. In some analyses, we further require that all IPOs 
have information in SDC on the offering’s lead underwriter, and in Compustat on 
leverage and assets after the time of the offering. This reduces the sample to 364 RLBOs 
and 3,799 total IPOs.  
 
Finally, we collect some information for the RLBOs exclusively. For the buyout 
group sponsoring the transaction, we determine the year of formation of its first fund and 
its total capital raised from its first fund to the most recent fund before the RLBO. This 
information was hand-collected from the SDC VentureXpert database. When multiple 
groups were investors, we used the information on the oldest or largest group (lead 
buyout firms), since we believed it would be critical in certifying the firm to investors. In 
addition, we manually collected from the prospectuses that the RLBOs filed with the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) information on the representation of the 
buyout group on the board of the firms and the buyout organization’s and management’s 
ownership holdings prior to and after the IPOs. This step further reduces our sample to a 
final sample of 251 RLBOs. The smaller sample of 251 is used whenever IPO ownership 
and governance data is analyzed. Otherwise, the larger sample of 364 RLBOs 
(COMPUSTAT-CRSP-SDC matched) or 428 (CRSP matched) is used. 
 
Tables 2, 3 and 4 summarize some of the key information collected. As Table 2 
reports, the RLBOs are considerably larger than the other IPOs (again, excluding unit 
offering, ADRs, closed-end funds, REITs, and smaller offerings based on share prices, 
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assets, and offering size). These offerings are less underpriced: their first-day return is 
less than half that of the other offerings. There are also considerably more leveraged after 
the IPOs (this ratio is the book value of debt to the sum of the book value of debt and the 
market value of equity) and  considerably more assets beforehand. Finally, at least 
partially reflecting the greater size of the offerings, the gross spread is lower for the 
RLBOs.6  
 
Table 3 provides some specific information about the RLBOs. The RLBO firms 
remain private for more than six years after LBOs. This is consistent with Kaplan (1992). 
The buyout groups’ total capital7 managed before the year of RLBO averages $2.9 
billion, but with a tremendous range. Similarly, buyout groups are on average 14 years 
old at the time of the RLBO, but with a great deal of diversity. As noted, above, both 
measures will be used as a proxy for buyout group reputation. The buyout group (or 
groups, if multiple investors are present) typically holds a majority ownership of 55% in 
the RLBO firms before the IPO and the ownership stake decreases to 38% after the 
offering, largely due to the effect of dilution from new share issues.8 Managers and 
directors also take large equity stakes: their ownership decreases from 66% pre-IPO to 
36% post-IPO. The buyout groups not only have large stakes in the RLBOs, but also 
actively monitor the managers. About 44% of the boards of directors are from or 
affiliated with buyout groups and 30% of RLBO firms have their chairman from buyout 
groups. In 14% of the cases, the president, CEO, and chairman (some of whom may hold 
multiple titles) are from or are affiliated with the buyout group.  
 
Table 4 summarizes the characteristics and accounting performance of the RLBOs 
shortly after the offering. The RLBO firm characteristics include the following: equity 
                                                 
6The accounting data in this table are taken from SDC. In subsequent analyses, all accounting data 
employed is from Compustat.   
 
7We replicate the analyses below using different measures of capital under management, and find the 
results are robust to their use.  
 
8All ownership stakes are calculated on a common share equivalent basis: that is, convertible preferred 
shares are converted into common stock at the ratio then in effect (typically at the time of the IPO, all 
classes of preferred stock are converted into common shares).  
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market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, assets, the ratio of operating income to 
assets, the ratio of net income to assets, the debt-to-assets ratio, the capital expenditures-
to-assets ratio, and the underwriter reputation. For each measure (except the reputation 
measure), we obtain data from the quarter immediately after IPO or the end of the quarter 
of the IPO. We then report the cross-sectional summary statistics. The last column reports 
sample mean, adjusted by the industry averages, which we compute for each two-digit 
industry using the Standard Industrial Classification scheme.  
 
Consistent with findings by DeGeorge and Zeckhauser (1993) and Holthausen 
and Larcker (1996), RLBOs have better financial performance than other IPOs. RLBO 
firms on average outperform the industry average. The operating return on assets (ROA) 
is 1.68% higher than the industry-adjusted average of other IPOs. Similar results hold for 
the ratio of net income to assets, which is 0.95% above the industry. Consistent with the 
earlier LBO literature, RLBO firms are more levered than others: their total debt to asset 
ratio is 30%, more than 9% above the industry median. Moreover, RLBOs are backed by 
more reputable underwriters than other IPOs; differences are again statistically 
significant.       
 
3. Analysis of RLBO Performance 
Panel A of Table 5 turns to the question at the heart of this study: whether RLBOs 
create value for investors. The table summarizes the cross-sectional mean and median 
performance measures of RLBOs within five years following the IPOs. The measures are 
the raw (unadjusted) buy-and-hold returns, the buy-and-hold returns adjusted by market 
(the value-weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index), and the alphas (excess returns) 
from the capital asset pricing (CAPM) model (also known as Jensen’s alpha) and from a 
three-factor Fama-French model.9
 
                                                 
9In the Fama-French regression, we employ as independent variables (in addition to the alpha, or constant 
term) RMRF, the value weighted market return on all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms (RM) minus the risk 
free rate (RF) that is the one-month Treasury bill rate, SMB (small minus big), the difference each month 
between the return on small- and large-capitalization firms, and HML (high minus low), the difference each 
month between a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-
market stocks. 
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The RLBOs deliver a raw buy-and-hold return of 18.25% over one year, 43.83% 
over three years, and 72.27% over five years after the IPOs. When this return is adjusted 
by value-weighted buy-and-hold market return, the mean remains positive, but is only 
statistically different from zero in the first year. (The previous study by Holthausen and 
Larcker (1996) did not find significant first year returns.) Risk-adjusted returns from the 
CAPM or Fama-French models are positive and significant over all the years after the 
IPOs. The coefficients on the alpha terms suggest that the offering outperform the market 
by between 0.4% and 0.6% per month in the five years after the offering.  
 
In Table 5, the market–adjusted RLBO performance has the median sharply 
below the mean. When we run regressions and compute the Jensen and Fama-French 
alpha, the mean does not differ significantly from median. A potential explanation is the 
large dispersion in the RLBO returns: there are many negative returns as well as very 
large positive returns. Simialrly, the market adjusted return has a very negative median 
but the mean is dominated by the very large positive returns. While we estimate 
regressions, the magnitude of such outliers is limited by the control variables, 
substantially reducing the differences between the mean and median. 
 
The evidence from Table 5 suggests that RLBOs outperform the market generally, 
but the extent depends on the evaluation methods. Panel B and C in Table 5 address the 
concerns in the literature (Mian and Rosenfeld (1993)) that performance of RLBOs is 
driven by premium paid for RLBOs which are acquired subsequent to the offerings. Panel 
B reports the performance of RLBOs for the sub-sample of firms that survive five years 
following the IPOs. Panel C reports the performance of sub-sample of firms that are 
merged within 60 months after the RLBOs. There are 252 firms that survive 60 months 
after the RLBOs. This sub-sample outperforms the market. For the surviving firms, the 
market-adjusted return is positive and significant after one year, two years, and three 
years following the RLBOs, but less consistently statistically significant thereafter. Panel 
C shows that the merged RLBO sub-sample consistently outperforms the market.  
 
 13
Over time, there have been “LBO waves,” where private equity groups have done 
a series of transactions in a single industry: for instance, many LBOs and RLBOs were in 
the 1980s were concentrated in the food retailing industry (Denis (1994), Chevalier 
(1995)). Moreover, different buyout groups have different industry foci.10 As a result, the 
industry mixture could be important factor to control for. More generally, Barber and 
Lyon (1997) argue that matching sample firms to control firms of similar size and with 
similar book-to-market ratios yield well-specified test statistics in the long-run 
performance studies.11 It might be particularly important to control for size and book-to-
market since RLBOs are larger and have high book-to-market ratios than other firms, as 
Table 3 showed. 
 
Figure 1 shows the geometric average returns for RLOBs over three years after 
going public. The bar shows the distribution of returns and the line is the fitted normal 
distribution. Two patterns emerge from the graph: (a) the bulk of the RLBO geometric 
returns are positive, with a positive median, and (b) the distribution of the geometric 
average returns is skewed, with fat tail at the left. These two patterns suggest that overall 
performance of RLBOs is positive and that poorly-performing RLBOs have strong 
impact on the distribution.  
 
Table 6 looks at the performance of various sub-groups of R:BOs. Much of the 
discussion in the business press about the performance of RLBOs has focused on 
offerings that went public soon after being bought out, as well as public firms that were 
taken private and then returned to the public marketplace. This table breaks down the 
offerings by whether the firm at the time of the LBO was private or public, the months 
the firm kept private between the LBO and the RLBO, the use of proceeds as debt 
reduction or other. The public LBO firms perform better than their private counterparts 
when they go public. The difference, though economically large, is not statistically 
significant.  
                                                 
10For instance, the Carlyle Group established its initial reputation through transactions in defense industry, 
while Silver Lake Partners focuses on high-technology firms.  
 
11Brav and Gompers (1997) find that after size and book-to-market ratios are controlled for, IPOs do not 
outperform the market, as the initial analyses in the literature suggested.   
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 We also divide the sample according to the months after the LBO and before the 
RLBO. If a firm was kept private longer than median holding period of 37 months, it 
actually performs slightly worse than the ones kept private shorter. But when we examine 
the “quick flips”--the 53 RLBOs that went public within a year after the LBO—these 
RLBOs perform much worse than those firms kept longer than one year by buyout 
groups. The differences are not statistically significant, though. The evidence provides a 
partial support for the claim that “flipping” LBOs does not provide much value. 
 
Panel D in Table 6 reports the sub-sample performance according to the use of 
proceeds to reduce debt or not.  For the firms that use the funds from RLBOs to reduce or 
retire debt, performance is much better. The differences are not statistically significant 
when using the value-weighted market benchmark or S&P 500 index returns. For the 
equal-weighted benchmark, the differences are significant at 10% level. The evidence 
suggests that debt reduction seems to create value for RLBO firms.  
 
The analysis in the Table 7 uses different benchmarks to examine the three-year 
RLBO performances using monthly data. The benchmarks include the return of the S&P 
500 index, equal- and value-weighted market portfolio, 5 X 5 Size and Book-to-Market 
portfolio returns, and the Fama-French 48 Industry portfolio. The performance measure 
employed is the wealth relative12 for the portfolios if RLBO firms, which is defined as  
 
Wealth Relative=∑(1+Ri,T)/ ∑(1+RBench i,T), 
 
where Ri,T is the buy-and-hold return on IPO i for period T and RBench i,T is the buy-and-
hold return on the benchmark portfolio over the same period. Whenever a firm is delisted 
within 36 months, we calculated the buy-and-hold return up to the delisting date.  
 
Panel A of Table 7 shows that when we equal-weight the RLBOs (that is, we treat 
each offering the same, regardless of size), they outperform various benchmarks, while 
                                                 
12 Brav and Gompers (1997) propose this measure in their long-run study of VC backed IPOs. 
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other IPOs underperform them by a considerable extent. The wealth relatives of the 
RLBOs are bigger than one for all benchmarks except for equal-weighted market 
portfolio, which is likely to be dominated by small (and presumably high-risk) NASDAQ 
companies. 
 
Panel B shows the value-weighted RLBO performance. We form the weights in 
this and subsequent tables using first-available market value of the RLBOs from 
Compustat, which is from the end of the quarter of the IPO. The value-weighted RLBOs 
continue to perform at least as well as the market in general, and considerably better than 
other offerings, though the effects are not as dramatic.  
 
We explore the robustness of the results in several ways. We use daily, rather than 
monthly, returns data and compute five-year (rather than three-year) returns. Both sets of 
analyses, which lead to few substantial differences, are reported in the Table 8 and 9.  
 
A natural question is whether the performance of RLBOs has varied over time. 
For instance, do offerings perform well initially, and then encounter difficulties? Have 
particular time periods been especially good or poor for RLBOs? 
 
Figure 2 shows the event-time average excess returns for each of the five years 
following the RLBOs. Panels A and B report the market adjusted returns, and Panels C 
and D report the adjusted returns using 5 X 5 Size and Book-to-Market portfolios. 
RLBOs have positive excess returns over the first year, forth and fifth years after the 
IPOs. When equal weighted, RLBOs underperform in years 2 and 3, but value-weighted 
RLBOs always have positive excess returns. 
 
Table 10 reports the three-year buy-and-hold returns for the RLBOs that took 
place in each calendar year. The long-run returns show great variation over the time. 
Performance tends to cluster together; the worst performances are concentrated in the 
mid- to late 1990s. There is, however, no regular pattern in long-run performance of other 
IPOs. Panel B of Table 10 shows that the value-weighted RLBOs perform better, with an 
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average wealth relative to S&P 500 of 1.26.13 This implies that following a buy-and-hold 
strategy, for every dollar earned holding the S&P 500 index, an investor would get 1.26 
dollars if instead investing in the RLBOs. Again, the poorest performing years are in 
1997 and 2000.  
 
Tests of long-run performance with buy-and-hold returns are subject to a variety 
of measurement problems, which are discussed by Barber and Lyon (1997) among others. 
One way to address this issue is to analyze the returns in calendar time, which is 
somewhat different from that in Table 10. Rather than computing the subsequent returns 
for the RLBOs that went public in a given year, the returns are computed for each year 
for a portfolio of the RLBOs that went public in recent years. In Table 11, the portfolio is 
formed by including returns within three years following the IPOs. Once again, we equal- 
and value-weight the observations. 
 
As the table reports, the equal-weighted portfolios have monthly excess returns of 
0.30%, while other IPOs under-perform the market on average. The value-weighted 
RLBO calendar-time portfolios outperform the market strongly. The monthly excess 
returns adjusted by value- and equal-weighted market index are 1.29% and 1.03%, both 
statistically significant at 1% level. The market-adjusted RLBO return is positive in most 
years, with the negative returns clustering in the 1990s. Other IPOs show marked under-
performance compared to the market. The excess returns adjusted by equal- and value-
weighted market are –0.59% and –0.76% respectively, significant at 1% level. In contrast 
to the RLBOs, other IPOs only outperform the market in a few years (including 1998 and 
1999, the Internet Bubble period).  
 
We run both CAPM and Fama-French regressions and report the results in the 
Table 12. Consistent with the former univariate tests, we find value-weighted RLBOs 
outperform the market significantly. Alphas from CAPM and Fama-French are about 1% 
per month, significant at 1% level. RLBOs have positive exposures to firm size (SMB) 
factor; the SMB coefficient is 0.7, significantly different from zero at the 1% level of 
                                                 
13The sample in Panel B is slightly smaller due to missing data needed to construct the value weights.  
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statistical significance. The book-to-market (HML) factor coefficient is not significant. 
By way of contrast, other IPOs under-perform the market consistently. Consistent with 
Ritter and Welch (2002), non-buyout backed IPOs have a market beta of 1.38. 
Coefficients to SMB and HML factors are slightly smaller than those in Ritter and Welch 
paper. Both SMB and HML coefficients are significant in these estimates.   
 
4. Cross-Sectional Differences across RLBOs 
 A natural next question has to do with the differences across offerings. What roles 
do buyout groups play in post-RLBO long-run performance? Does equity ownership and 
governance structure have any impact on post-RLBO long-run performance? Moreover, 
does the financial situation of the firm post-offering affect its subsequent performance, as 
one of the initial quotes suggested?  
 
In this section, we seek to answer these questions with multivariate analyses that 
explain performance of RLBOs in the three years after going public. We find that the 
performance of RLBOs is cross-sectionally associated with ownership, governance, and 
the buyout group reputation proxies.  
 
 Table 13 reports the multivariate regression results conditional on the offering 
being an RLBO. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the three-year wealth 
relative, defined as above, where the benchmark is the value-weighted buy-and-hold 
return of the market. The right-hand side variables include the two proxies for buyout 
group reputation: the natural logarithm of the buyout firm’s capital under management 
and age at the RLBO date. In addition, we employ a dummy variable denoting whether 
the chairman of the firm is from the buyout group, the percentage of board controlled by 
the buyout group at the time of the IPO, the buyout firm’s equity ownership immediately 
after the firm’s IPO, the logarithm of the equity market capitalization at the end of the 
quarter of the IPO, the debt-to-total capitalization ratio after the IPO at the end of the 
quarter of the IPO (again computed as the book value of all outstanding debt divided by 
the sum of the book value of debt and the market value of equity), and the underwriter 
reputation. All variables except for the underwriter rank are computed using data from 
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the quarter immediately after IPO or the end of the quarter of the IPO. Columns 1 
through 4 report the results from basic regressions; columns 5 through 8 with year and 
industry fixed effects.  
 
When we first look at the buyout group reputation proxies without controls, we 
find that RLBOs by younger groups perform better. Changes in buyout group size, 
however, is associated with no change in performance. Contrary to the claims in the 
quote in the introduction, more levered offerings perform better, not worse.  While 
greater representation of the buyout group on the board is positively (if insignificantly) 
associated with performance, companies with a buyout group affiliate as their chair 
perform poorly. One possibility is that in these firms, the transition to a public firm is 
more wrenching (typically, buyout groups’ representatives sever their ties to the 
companies at some point after the IPO). 
 
We know, however, that the relative performance of IPOs differs across time 
periods. Moreover, as noted above, the industry composition of these buyouts has 
changed over time. It thus makes sense to add industry and offering year controls to the 
regressions. 
 
When we do add these controls in the final four regressions in Table 13, we find 
that the negative coefficient on age disappears. The coefficient in the earlier regressions 
may have reflected the fact that offerings in the 1980s, when buyout groups were 
disproportionately young, did particularly well. Similarly, the coefficient on leverage is 
no longer significant. What is positive and significant in the final regression is the 
coefficient on buyout group size, while the coefficient for the market capitalization of the 
RLBO has no significant explanatory power. This result suggests that large RLBOs do 
particularly well because they are sponsored by large buyout groups.14  
       
                                                 
14In unreported regressions, we also add controls for the LBO group sponsoring the transaction. Once this 
control is added, the other independent variables are uniformly insignificant. This suggests the RLBOs of 
buyout groups that eventually become large outperform through the group’s life-span, and not just once 
they raise substantial amounts of funds.  
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5. Conclusions 
 In this paper, we take a comprehensive view of RLBOs over the past 25 years. 
The rapid growth in the private equity industry, and the changes in the industry’s 
structure in the past two decades, suggest the desirability of understanding the 
performance of offerings since the 1980s. 
 
Examining a sample of nearly 500 offerings between 1980 and 2002, we find: 
• On average, RLBOs are much larger in size, have more leverage and higher book-
to-market ratios, are more profitable, and are backed by more reputable 
underwriters. 
• Unlike other IPOs, LBOs, by and large, create wealth for equity holders in the 
long run. Value-weighted calendar time portfolios strongly outperform the 
market. When we explore the robustness of the results, CAPM and Fama-French 
models deliver the same results.  
• The RLBO outperformance is especially strong in the first year, fourth and fifth 
years after the IPOs. 
• The superior performance is not confined to a single time period, but has been 
found in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s.  
• Larger RLBOs appear to perform better, but this seems driven by their 
sponsorship by larger buyout groups. 
• Greater leverage after the IPO does not lead to poorer performance. 
  
 This research leaves a number of questions open, which we hope to explore in 
later work. First, we have taken an initial look at the buyout groups’ involvement with 
their portfolio firms and how it impacts value accretion of RLBOs. Characterizing in 
more detail the extent of the buyout groups’ involvement, and understanding the 
consequences of those connections, is challenging. But if these relationships can be 
tracked more carefully (as has been done in research on venture capital), they should help 
us enhance our understanding of the buyout process. Second, we have focused here 
exclusively on offerings that have gone public. The outcome of buyout investments more 
 20
generally, and the types of firms selected for each form of exit, remain surprisingly 
poorly understood.   
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Table 1. Year Distribution of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts 
 
The sample includes all RLBOs and other IPOs from January 1980 to December 2002. 
Column 2 and 3 present the numbers of RLBOs and LBOs for each year. Column 4 
shows the yearly distribution of number of venture capital-backed IPOs. Column 5 shows 
the total number of IPOs, excluding American Depository Receipts, Real Estate 
Investment Trusts, closed-end funds, unit offerings, and IPOs with an offering size 
smaller than $1.5 million, firm assets less than $5 million, or an offering price of under 
$5 per share. Columns 6 and 7 compute RLBOs as percentage of LBOs and VC-backed 
IPOs, and Column 8 and 9 show RLBO as percentages of total IPOs in value and in 
number.   
 
Year RLBOs LBOs 
VC-
Backed 
IPOs 
Total IPOs 
RLBO as 
fraction of 
LBOs 
RLBO Share 
of VC-Backed 
IPOs 
RLBO Value 
Share of All 
IPO Value 
RLBO Share 
of All IPOs 
1980 3 17 31 73 17.65% 9.68% 1.43% 4.11% 
1981 1 15 77 189 6.67% 1.30% 2.45% 0.53% 
1982 0 15 30 73 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
1983 10 46 138 475 21.74% 7.25% 0.73% 2.11% 
1984 3 112 58 190 2.68% 5.17% 9.78% 1.58% 
1985 11 153 46 198 7.19% 23.91% 16.17% 5.56% 
1986 26 235 99 456 11.06% 26.26% 9.87% 5.70% 
1987 34 212 75 305 16.04% 45.33% 2.15% 11.15% 
1988 3 298 39 116 1.01% 7.69% 6.94% 2.59% 
1989 5 299 40 113 1.67% 12.50% 13.87% 4.42% 
1990 12 191 42 97 6.28% 28.57% 60.21% 12.37% 
1991 39 181 113 227 21.55% 34.51% 40.47% 17.18% 
1992 67 218 124 299 30.73% 54.03% 14.41% 22.41% 
1993 40 180 176 473 22.22% 22.73% 4.15% 8.46% 
1994 28 178 121 340 15.73% 23.14% 9.49% 8.24% 
1995 18 209 178 389 8.61% 10.11% 10.96% 4.63% 
1996 26 194 253 565 13.40% 10.28% 10.74% 4.60% 
1997 37 202 127 417 18.32% 29.13% 15.96% 8.87% 
1998 28 177 71 272 15.82% 39.44% 17.26% 10.29% 
1999 33 183 261 440 18.03% 12.64% 12.28% 7.50% 
2000 29 296 219 349 9.80% 13.24% 2.99% 8.31% 
2001 22 167 44 75 13.17% 50.00% 11.24% 29.33% 
2002 21 154 32 71 13.64% 65.63% 16.12% 29.58% 
Total 496 3915 2,394 6,202 12.67% 20.72% 13.17% 8.00% 
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Table 2.  Summary Statistics for RLBOs and Other IPOs  
  
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs and 5,706 other IPOs between January 1980 and December 2002. 
We exclude American Depository Receipts, Real Estate Investment Trusts, closed-end funds, unit 
offerings, and IPOs with an offering size smaller than $1.5 million, firm assets less than $5 million, or 
an offering price of under $5 per share. Mean characteristics for RLBOs and non-buyout backed IPOs 
are provided. Summary statistics include the mean gross proceeds, under-pricing (first-day return), 
leverage immediately after the IPOs (the ratio of the book value of all outstanding debt to the sum of 
equity market capitalization and the book value of debt), firm assets immediately prior to the IPOs, and 
gross spread. Information on underpricing is not available from SDC prior to 1986; that on assets is 
unavailable prior to 1985.       
 
 RLBOS Non-Buyout backed IPOs 
 
 
Gross 
Proceeds 
(Million) 
Under-
pricing 
(Perce
ntage) 
Total 
Debt/Capit
alization 
After IPOs 
Assets 
Before 
IPOs 
(Million) 
Gross 
Spread 
(Percent
age) 
Gross 
Proceeds 
(Million) 
Under-
pricing 
(Perce
ntage) 
Total 
Debt/Cap
italization 
After 
IPOs 
Assets 
Before 
IPOs 
(Million) 
Gross 
Spread 
(Percent
age) 
1980 15.00  20.01  7.00 13.70  29.30  7.78 
1981 23.40  49.21  7.18 12.76  23.32  7.86 
1983 53.11  33.17  6.58 23.06  33.95  7.49 
1984 21.03  56.38  7.07 13.94  37.29  7.65 
1985 19.40  53.98 234.20 7.31 33.59  39.13 57.74 7.48 
1986 37.79 4.09 53.28 169.47 6.97 30.59 70.77 41.53 70.87 7.26 
1987 44.61 10.39 61.73 216.19 6.85 31.38 32.76 37.90 67.32 7.27 
1988 55.23 -0.14 46.29 151.78 6.84 34.57 49.91 40.76 69.32 7.10 
1989 46.24 3.21 59.28 854.60 6.75 33.72 56.24 31.45 46.32 7.21 
1990 38.79 16.37 58.06 142.83 6.85 40.95 28.50 25.60 36.81 7.04 
1991 59.94 14.00 45.79 244.80 6.50 43.87 32.44 24.76 58.48 6.88 
1992 65.60 9.08 49.08 173.33 6.82 49.14 13.64 26.20 45.70 7.07 
1993 77.57 10.44 47.16 136.01 6.80 59.33 14.91 27.38 63.06 6.99 
1994 66.23 9.37 44.01 220.00 6.78 56.27 13.86 30.33 56.39 7.03 
1995 89.05 5.81 32.05 162.81 6.55 56.55 28.27 22.81 51.80 7.06 
1996 118.20 13.48 54.93 295.11 6.67 54.81 20.29 23.15 53.97 7.09 
1997 112.72 11.92 39.65 321.23 6.77 70.92 15.16 22.54 68.62 7.03 
1998 134.54 42.72 40.72 287.26 6.62 62.30 22.04 24.60 100.98 7.02 
1999 147.01 54.21 51.18 260.98 6.60 80.26 73.00 13.77 76.38 6.91 
2000 163.89 31.67 34.29 218.51 6.55 64.77 61.25 9.41 97.60 6.96 
2001 148.13 15.06 38.58 350.52 6.72 142.38 15.34 20.34 114.80 6.54 
2002 202.62 10.30 36.52 335.83 6.76 145.53 9.24 27.52 223.55 6.67 
AVG 79.09 15.41 47.87 265.30 6.79 52.47 32.80 27.84 75.74 7.19 
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Table 3. Summary Statistics for Buyout Firms. 
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs between January 1980 and December 2002. The table 
reports summary statistics for the buyout firms sponsoring the RLBOs and the RLBOs 
themselves. The variables include years between the buyout and the RLBO, the total capital 
raised by the buyout group prior to the RLBO date, the buyout group’s age at the time of the 
offering (the years between buyout group’s first fund and RLBO year), the share of equity 
held by buyout group or groups and the management and directors as a whole before and 
after the IPO, the share of the board filled by representatives of the buyout group at the time 
of the IPO, dummy variables indicating whether the chairman of the firm was from (or was 
previously affiliated with) the buyout group and whether the CEO, president and chairman of 
the firm was from (or was previously affiliated with) the buyout group.   
 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
Years of staying 
private after LBO 6.87 3.08 3.55 0.17 27.25 
Buyout Group Capital 
Managed Prior to 
RLBO ($ Million) 
2876.18 1258.40 4426.83 2.8 27582.4 
Buyout Group Age   
Before RLBO  14.22 13 7.95 1 41 
Buyout Group 
Ownership Before IPO 55.3% 52.6% 26.4% 5% 100% 
Buyout Group 
Ownership  
After IPO 
37.9% 36.2% 20.5% 0% 85.1% 
Board Share of Buyout 
Group  44.0% 42.9% 20.6% 0% 100% 
Director/Management 
Ownership Before IPO  66.2% 68.5% 23.2% 6.9% 100% 
Director/Management 
Ownership After IPO  36.0% 35.1% 26.8% 0% 86.9% 
Chairman from Buyout 
group 29.19% 0 46.56% 0 1 
CEO, President, and 
Chairman from Buyout 
Group 
14.09% 0 24.81% 0 1 
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Table 4. Summary Statistics for RLBOs 
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs between January 1980 and December 2002. The table 
reports summary statistics for the RLBO firms. The RLBO firm characteristics include 
the following: equity market capitalization, book-to-market ratio, assets, the ratio of 
operating income to assets, the ratio of net income to assets, the debt-to-assets ratio, the 
capital expenditures-to-assets ratio, and the underwriter reputation (on a zero to nine 
scale, with 9 being the highest). All variables except for the underwriter rank are 
computed using data from the quarter immediately after IPO or the end of the quarter of 
the IPO. The last column reports the industry-adjusted sample averages. Test statistics are 
based on Wilcoxon tests comparing the means of RLBOs and other IPOs.      
 
 Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Industry 
Adjusted by 
Other IPOs 
Market Value ($ Million) 902.84 452.72 2077.88 433.92*** 
Book/Market 0.62 0.45 0.72 0.15*** 
Assets ($ Million) 955.04 406.98 2001.35 357.53*** 
Operating Income/Assets 3.76% 3.58% 2.83% 2.48%*** 
Net Income/Assets 1.98% 0.88% 3.14% 1.79%*** 
Debt/Assets 33.43% 31.32% 24.95% 13.21%*** 
CAPEX /Assets 4.46% 3.21% 4.22% -2.75%*** 
Underwriter Rank 8.65 9 0.95 1.10*** 
 
***= significant at the 1% confidence level; **=5%; *=10%. 
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Table 5. Event-Time Stock Performance 
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs between January 1980 and December 2002. The raw returns are the 
buy-and-hold returns starting the day after the IPO and ending 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 months after the IPO 
date. The market-adjusted returns are the buy-and-hold raw returns minus the buy-and-hold value-weighted 
NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ index computed over the same 12-, 24-, 36-, 48- and 60-month time periods. 
Jensen alphas are the intercepts estimated by running firm-specific time-series regressions of monthly firm 
excess returns on the value weighted NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ excess returns for 12, 24, 36, 48, and 60 
months after the IPO. FF alphas are similar intercepts estimated using Fama-French factors as independent 
variables. If the sample firm delists, the raw return, market-adjusted return, Jensen’s alpha, and FF alpha are 
set equal to zero after the delisting date. The two-tailed significance levels reported in parentheses below the 
means are based on the one-sample t-test and the two-tailed significance levels reported below the median 
are based on the one-sample Wilcoxon test. All four stock return measures are expressed in percentages.  
Panel B is restricted to firms that remained listed for sixty months after the RLBO; Panel C is limited to 
firms acquired within sixty months of the RLBO.  
Panel A: Total sample of RLBOs   
 
 12 months 24 months 36 months 48 months 60 months 
 N=428 N=428 N=428 N=428 N=428 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Raw Returns 18.25 (0.00) 
5.96 
(0.00) 
26.21 
(0.00) 
4.40 
(0.00) 
43.83 
(0.00) 
2.70 
(0.01) 
63.54 
(0.00) 
2.59 
(0.01) 
72.27 
(0.00) 
9.91 
(0.00) 
Market-adj. 8.10 (0.02) 
6.08 
(.58) 
3.47 
(0.46) 
-9.78 
(0.38) 
6.34 
(0.45) 
-17.55 
(0.02) 
7.88 
(0.52) 
-27.69 
(0.00) 
15.45 
(0.34) 
-31.82 
(0.01) 
Jensen alpha 0.65 (0.01) 
0.62 
(0.01) 
0.65 
(0.01) 
0.46 
(0.01) 
0.65 
(0.01) 
0.39 
(0.03) 
0.65 
(0.05) 
0.61 
(0.03) 
0.50 
(0.01) 
0.52 
(0.01) 
FF alpha  0.71 
 
 
(0.02) 
0.29 
(0.06) 
0.57 
(0.01) 
0.48 
(0.01) 
0.56 
(0.01) 
0.44 
(0.09) 
0.45 
(0.01) 
0.48 
(0.08) 
0.44 
(0.01) 
0.45 
(0.00) 
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Panel B: Sample of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts still listed 60 months after month of IPO  
 
 12 months 24 months 36 months 48 months 60 months 
 N=251 N=251 N=251 N=251 N=251 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Raw Returns 17.59 (0.00) 
7.31 
(0.00) 
28.29 
(0.00) 
8.02 
(0.00) 
48.66 
(0.00) 
10.16 
(0.00) 
66.48 
(0.00) 
9.08 
(0.00) 
87.85 
(0.00) 
9.35 
(0.00) 
Market-adj. 9.32 (0.03) 
0.22 
(0.27) 
9.09 
(0.06) 
-7.56 
(0.90) 
13.85 
(0.06) 
-14.59 
(0.31) 
12.7 
(0.12) 
-28.35 
(0.12) 
12.95 
(0.15) 
-32.54 
(0.09) 
Jensen alpha 0.64 (0.06) 
0.83 
(0.03) 
0.64 
(0.06) 
0.52 
(0.03) 
0.43 
(0.06) 
0.39 
(0.03) 
0.51 
(0.06) 
0.48 
(0.03) 
0.50 
(0.06) 
0.43 
(0.03) 
FF alpha 0.61 (0.09) 
0.01 
(0.25) 
0.22 
(0.33) 
0.25 
(0.42) 
0.32 
(0.08) 
0.22 
(0.09) 
0.28 
(0.09) 
0.25 
(0.14) 
0.29 
(0.06) 
0.12 
(0.02) 
 
Panel C: Sample of Reverse Leveraged Buyouts acquired within 60 months of the IPO 
   
 12 months 24 months 36 months 48 months 60 months 
 N=139 N=139 N=139 N=139 N=139 
 Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Raw Returns 19.18 (0.00) 
5.92 
(0.00) 
42.05 
(0.01) 
26.27 
(0.02) 
56.93 
(0.00) 
30.97 
(0.00) 
68.23 
(0.00) 
33.66 
(0.00) 
79.26 
(0.00) 
37.08 
(0.00) 
Market-adj. 12.22 (0.04) 
2.59 
(0.32) 
18.11 
(0.03) 
-1.83 
(0.31) 
22.43 
(0.02) 
1.62 
(0.34) 
24.35 
(0.05) 
0.43 
(0.32) 
29.43 
(0.04) 
5.08 
(0.26) 
Jensen alpha 0.87 (0.03) 
0.76 
(0.03) 
1.46 
(0.02) 
0.89 
(0.08) 
1.42 
(0.00) 
0.78 
(0.00) 
1.45 
(0.00) 
1.05 
(0.00) 
1.51 
(0.00) 
1.05 
(0.00) 
FF alpha 0.75 
 
(0.17) 
0.52 
(0.12) 
1.62 
(0.09) 
0.97 
(0.06) 
1.62 
(0.00) 
0.95 
(0.00) 
1.57 
(0.00) 
1.18 
(0.00) 
1.32 
(0.00) 
1.02 
(0.00) 
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Table 6. Three-Year Market-Adjusted Performance for Sub-Samples  
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs* between January 1980 and December 2002. For each IPO, 
the returns are calculated by compounding monthly returns for 35 months after the IPO, less 
the buy-and-hold return on the benchmark over the same period. If the IPO is delisted before 
35th month we compound the return until the delisting date. The last column reports the P-
value of the difference between two sub-samples. Observations are divided by whether the firm 
was public or privately held prior to the LBO, the holding period between the LBO and the 
RLBO, and the use of proceeds as debt reduction.  
 
 
Panel A. Private LBOs vs. public LBOs  
 
 Private LBOs (254) 
Public LBOs 
(114) 
P-Value for 
Difference in 
Difference 
Value-weighted Market 
Benchmark 8.03 25.34 0.29 
Equal-weighted Market 
Benchmark -0.45 16.51 0.30 
S & P 500 Index Return 13.98 31.76 0.28 
 
Panel B. Above vs. Below Median LBO Holding Periods  
 Above Median (180) 
Below Median 
(188) 
P-Value for 
Difference in 
Difference 
Value-weighted Market 
Benchmark 12.26 14.58 0.87 
Equal-weighted Market 
Benchmark 3.38 6.32 0.84 
S & P 500 Index Return 18.04 21.00 0.85 
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Panel C. Longer Holding Periods vs, ”Quick Flips”   
 Above 12 Months (315) 
Below 12 Months 
(53) 
P-Value for 
Difference in 
Difference 
Value-weighted Market 
Benchmark 8.64 -17.89 0.22 
Equal-weighted Market 
Benchmark 17.36 -10.17 0.21 
S & P 500 Index Return 23.65 -4.69 0.19 
 
Panel D. Use of Proceeds is Debt Reduction vs. Other Use  
 Debt Reduction (172) 
Other Use 
(181) 
P-Value for 
Difference in 
Difference 
Value-weighted Market 
Benchmark 17.31 1.93 0.32 
Equal-weighted Market 
Benchmark 17.74 -12.24 0.06 
S & P 500 Index Return 22.96 8.61 0.37 
 
Table 6 reports only 368 RLBOs in Panel A, B, C and reports 353 RLBOs in Panel D, 
which are smaller than the CRSP matched RLBOs sample of 428. This results from the 
missing information on LBOs/IPOs in our sample. 
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Table 7. Three-Year Unadjusted and Benchmark Performance using Monthly Returns  
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs and 5,706 other IPOs between January 1980 and December 
2002. Three-year equal- and value-weighted returns for IPOs are computed using alternative 
benchmarks. The value-weighted returns in Panel B are formed using the market value of the 
firm at the end of the quarter of its IPO. For each IPO, the returns are calculated by 
compounding monthly returns for 35 months after the IPO. If the IPO is delisted before 35th 
month we compound the return until the delisting date. Wealth relatives are calculated as 
W=∑(1+Ri,T)/ ∑(1+RBench i,T), where Ri,T is the buy-and-hold return on IPO i for period T and 
RBench i,T is the buy-and-hold return on the benchmark portfolio over the same period.  
 
 Buyout-backed IPO Non-buyout backed IPO  
Benchmarks IPO Return 
Benchmark 
Return 
Wealth 
Relative
IPO 
Return 
Benchmark 
Return 
Wealth 
Relative
Panel A: Three-Year Equal-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Return 
S&P 500 Index 43.83 27.85 1.10 18.06 37.97 0.85 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Value-weighted 43.83 34.17 1.05 18.06 43.92 0.82 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Equal-weighted 43.83 41.75 0.99 18.06 37.29 0.85 
Size and Book-Market 
(5×5)  38.68 37.22 1.01 18.94 32.15 0.90 
Fama-French 48 Industry 
Portfolios 43.83 35.61 1.06 18.67 34.76 0.88 
Panel B: Three-Year Value-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Return 
S&P 500 Index 25.52 19.73 1.05 13.56 38.96 0.81 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Value-weighted 25.52 25.06 1.00 13.56 44.54 0.78 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Equal-weighted 25.52 40.78 0.95 13.56 36.62 0.83 
Size and Book-Market 
(5×5)  34.07 25.05 1.07 12.07 23.43 0.91 
Fama-French 48 Industry 
Portfolios 25.52 33.07 0.94 13.45 42.99 0.79 
 
The Size and Book-Market Portfolio requires RLBO sample to have data/information on 
Size and Book-to-Market ratio. We drop those RLBOs that have missing Book-to-Market 
ratio. 
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Table 8. Three-Year Unadjusted and Benchmark Performance using Daily Returns  
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs and 5,706 other IPOs between January 1980 and 
December 2002. Three-year equal- and value-weighted returns on IPOs are compared with 
alternative benchmarks. The value-weighted returns in Panel B are formed using the market 
value of the firm at the end of the quarter of its IPO. For each IPO, the monthly returns are 
calculated by compounding daily returns up to the end of the month of the IPO and from then 
on compounding monthly returns for 35 months. If the IPO is delisted before 35th month we 
compound the return until the delisting date. Wealth relatives are calculated as ∑(1+Ri,T)/ 
∑(1+RBench i,T), where Ri,T is the buy-and-hold return on IPO i for period T and RBench i,T is the 
buy-and-hold return on the benchmark portfolio over the same period. 
 
 Buyout-backed IPO  Non-buyout backed IPO 
Benchmarks IPO Return 
Benchmark 
Return 
Wealth 
Relative
IPO 
Return 
Benchmark 
Return 
Wealth 
Relative
Panel A: Three-Year Equal-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Return 
S&P 500 Index 43.07 26.03 1.14 18.06 37.97 0.85 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Value-weighted 43.07 31.96 1.08 18.06 43.92 0.82 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Equal-weighted 43.07 100.16 0.71 18.06 37.29 0.85 
Size and Book-Market 
(5×5)  40.27 39.08 1.01 18.93 32.15 0.90 
Fama-French 48 Industry 
Portfolios 43.07 35.13 1.06 18.67 34.76 0.88 
Panel B: Three-Year Value-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Return 
S&P 500 Index 33.81 26.16 1.06 13.56 38.96 0.81 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Value-weighted 33.81 32.09 1.01 13.56 44.54 0.78 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Equal-weighted 33.81 100.43 0.67 13.56 36.62 0.83 
Size and Book-Market 
(5×5)  29.14 27.83 1.01 12.07 23.43 0.91 
Fama-French 48 Industry 
Portfolio 33.81 32.81 1.01 13.45 42.99 0.79 
 
The Size and Book-Market Portfolio require RLBO sample to have data/information on 
Size and Book-to-Market ratio. We drop those RLBOs that have missing Book-to-Market 
ratio. The difference between monthly and daily results mainly comes from micro-
structure issues in the daily data. 
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Table 9. Five-Year Unadjusted and Benchmark Performance using Monthly Returns  
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs and 5,706 other IPOs between January 1980 and December 
2002. Five-year equal- and value-weighted returns on IPOs are computed using alternative 
benchmarks. The value-weighted returns in Panel B are formed using the market value of the 
firm at the end of the quarter of its IPO. For each IPO, the returns are calculated by 
compounding monthly returns for 59 months after the IPO. If the IPO is delisted before 59th 
month we compound the return until the delisting date. Wealth relatives are calculated as 
W=∑(1+Ri,T)/ ∑(1+RBench i,T), where Ri,T is the buy-and-hold return on IPO i for period T and 
RBench i,T is the buy-and-hold return on the benchmark portfolio over the same period.  
 
 Buyout-backed IPO Non-buyout backed IPO 
Benchmarks IPO Return 
Benchmark 
Return 
Wealth 
Relative
IPO 
Return 
Benchmark 
Return 
Wealth 
Relative
Panel A: Five-Year Equal-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Return 
S&P 500 Index 72.27 60.79 1.07 31.57 63.22 0.81 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Value-weighted 72.27 68.42 1.02 31.57 73.89 0.76 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Equal-weighted 72.27 53.54 1.12 31.57 61.79 0.81 
Size and Book-Market 
(5×5)  71.61 67.83 1.09 30.37 54.29 0.84 
Fama-French Industry 
Portfolio 72.27 63.98 1.05 31.31 58.52 0.83 
Panel B: Five-Year Value-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Return 
S&P 500 Index 58.93 32.25 1.20 20.96 63.07 0.74 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Value-weighted 58.93 41.72 1.12 20.96 73.22 0.70 
NYSE/NASDAQ/AMEX 
Equal-weighted 58.93 71.89 0.93 20.96 60.89 0.75 
Size and Book-Market 
(5×5)  54.79 53.93 1.01 18.82 32.14 0.90 
Fama-French 48 Industry 
Portfolio 58.93 54.77 1.03 23.03 71.09 0.72 
 
The Size and Book-Market Portfolio requires RLBO sample to have data/information on Size 
e drop those RLBOs that have missing Book-to-Market ratio. and Book-to-Market ratio. W 
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 Table 10. Three-Year Unadjusted and Benchmark Performance by Cohort Year  
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs and 5,706 other IPOs between January 1980 and December 
2002.  The value-weighted returns in Panel B are formed using the market value of the firm at 
the end of the quarter of its IPO. For each cohort of IPOs that went public in a given year, the 
returns are calculated by compounding monthly returns for 35 months. Wealth relatives are 
calculated as Wi,T =(1+Ri,T)/ ∑(1+RBench i,T), where Ri,T is the buy-and-hold return on IPO i for 
period T and RBench,T is the buy-and-hold return on the S&P 500 Index over the same period.  
 
 Buyout-Backed IPOs Non Buyout-backed IPOs 
 
 
Number 
of IPOs 
IPO 
Return 
S&P 500 
Index 
Wealth 
Relatives 
Number 
of IPOs 
IPO 
Return 
S&P 500 
Index 
Wealth 
Relatives 
 Panel A: Equal-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Portfolio Returns 
         
1980 3 184.19 31.59 2.16 56 57.41 27.94 1.23 
1981 1 -54.93 20.71 0.37 174 21.92 22.54 0.99 
1982 0    65 11.60 45.23 0.77 
1983 6 18.17 36.58 0.87 344 19.60 41.94 0.84 
1984 2 65.63 75.62 0.94 185 30.13 65.75 0.79 
1985 7 39.41 38.41 1.01 172 2.84 41.74 0.73 
1986 18 51.79 31.00 1.16 337 5.57 30.02 0.81 
1987 23 75.87 10.47 1.59 258 -10.54 14.12 0.78 
1988 3 -64.42 38.79 0.26 121 12.72 38.34 0.81 
1989 2 43.11 25.24 1.14 117 27.66 27.31 1.00 
1990 8 50.26 29.23 1.16 94 23.78 31.43 0.94 
1991 22 51.21 22.63 1.23 189 29.28 21.46 1.06 
1992 64 53.08 19.71 1.28 245 19.81 23.88 0.97 
1993 40 89.75 41.52 1.34 401 26.10 41.24 0.89 
1994 26 61.44 65.88 0.97 313 56.62 73.22 0.90 
1995 16 61.00 84.18 0.87 286 19.16 85.07 0.64 
1996 25 46.95 86.64 0.79 428 8.09 85.92 0.58 
1997 33 8.40 63.40 0.66 280 78.98 62.14 1.10 
1998 26 13.67 18.09 0.96 180 28.09 19.60 1.07 
1999 32 -36.09 -19.34 0.79 290 -38.80 -15.61 0.73 
2000 29 -30.34 -33.74 1.05 186 -60.55 -31.93 0.58 
2001 21 23.26 -6.87 1.32 54 40.45 -7.99 1.53 
2002 21 82.28 15.29 1.58 66 60.58 24.07 1.29 
Average 18.61 57.87 31.19 1.07 210.48 20.46 33.37 0.91 
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 Buyout-Backed IPOs Non Buyout-backed IPOs 
 Number of IPOs 
IPO 
Return 
S&P 500 
Index 
Wealth 
Relatives 
Number 
of IPOs 
IPO 
Return 
S&P 500 
Index 
Wealth 
Relatives 
Panel B: Value-Weighted Buy-and-Hold Portfolio Returns 
1980 3 570.24 43.40 4.67 52 63.68 30.58 1.25 
1981 1 -56.49 21.03 0.36 168 39.26 23.64 1.13 
1982 0    60 8.31 45.93 0.74 
1983 6 4.05 15.46 0.90 312 13.68 42.67 0.80 
1984 2 44.74 43.82 1.01 179 85.62 68.10 1.10 
1985 5 89.32 58.47 1.19 156 11.80 42.10 0.79 
1986 15 35.13 13.08 1.19 289 43.02 29.87 1.10 
1987 23 97.99 30.36 1.52 209 14.50 13.78 1.01 
1988 2 29.66 15.46 1.12 115 47.21 37.31 1.07 
1989 2 -52.77 33.53 0.35 101 30.86 25.67 1.04 
1990 8 29.78 19.74 1.08 92 76.50 29.66 1.36 
1991 21 17.36 27.67 0.92 177 45.81 20.39 1.21 
1992 63 40.12 17.74 1.19 223 35.11 22.72 1.10 
1993 38 131.94 24.30 1.87 367 34.47 41.76 0.95 
1994 26 41.73 46.49 0.97 286 95.30 73.25 1.13 
1995 16 127.22 78.25 1.27 265 25.94 85.20 0.68 
1996 22 98.55 69.14 1.17 423 117.61 85.90 1.17 
1997 33 1.65 79.47 0.57 261 157.30 62.05 1.59 
1998 26 38.45 53.68 0.90 162 89.54 18.58 1.60 
1999 27 45.14 5.25 1.38 278 -51.47 -16.14 0.58 
2000 29 -64.33 -27.50 0.49 168 -62.99 -32.46 0.55 
2001 21 -24.79 -31.36 1.10 53 8.32 -8.52 1.18 
2002 20 62.93 -4.10 1.70 64 63.43 18.57 1.25 
Average 17.78 59.21 29.01 1.22 193.91 43.02 33.13 1.06 
 
Panel B reports fewer RLBOs and other IPOs than Panel A. Panel A includes all RLBOs 
and other IPOs that have return data in CRSP. Panel B drops firms that do not have 
accounting information of market capitalization in Compustat.  
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Table 11. Calendar-Time Market-Adjusted Performance  
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs and 5,706 other IPOs between January 1980 and 
December 2002. We form the calendar-time portfolio according to the IPO date and then 
calculate average monthly excess return for each Calendar year, adjusting by equal- and 
value-weighted market returns (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ). Returns are computed for 
each year for firms whose IPO occurred within the last 35 months. The returns are 
average monthly returns. 
 
Panel A: Equal-Weighted Calendar-Time Portfolio 
 
 RLBO Non-Buyout Backed IPO 
 
 
Value-Weighted 
Market-adj. 
(Percentage) 
Equal-Weighted 
Market-adj. 
(Percentage) 
Value-Weighted 
Market-adj. 
(Percentage)  
Equal-Weighted 
Market-adj. 
(Percentage) 
1980 -0.91 -1.62 1.11 0.40 
1981 1.16 0.80 0.16 -0.21 
1982 1.79 1.48 0.54 0.23 
1983 0.84 -0.21 0.51 -0.53 
1984 -0.52 0.75 -2.30 -1.03 
1985 1.01 1.37 -0.63 -0.26 
1986 0.82 1.42 -1.13 -0.52 
1987 0.35 1.15 -2.04 -1.24 
1988 2.27 2.16 0.23 0.12 
1989 0.41 1.59 -1.29 -0.11 
1990 -2.00 -0.49 -1.95 -0.44 
1991 1.70 0.61 1.70 0.61 
1992 1.36 -0.01 0.31 -1.07 
1993 -0.10 -1.20 -0.04 -1.14 
1994 0.42 0.79 -0.98 -0.61 
1995 -1.41 -1.07 -0.61 -0.27 
1996 0.19 0.38 -0.69 -0.50 
1997 -0.67 0.00 -1.78 -1.11 
1998 -1.14 0.74 -1.74 0.13 
1999 -0.27 -0.85 1.72 1.14 
2000 -1.57 -1.67 -4.06 -4.15 
2001 3.53 0.64 3.25 0.36 
2002 -0.87 -1.88 -1.27 -2.29 
2003 1.66 -0.61 3.65 1.38 
2004 1.19 0.51 0.68 -0.46 
2005 -1.39 -1.34 -0.43 -0.50 
Mean 0.30 0.13 -0.27 -0.44*** 
 
***= significant at the 1% confidence level; **=5%; *=10%. 
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Panel B: Value-Weighted Calendar-Time Portfolio 
 
 RLBO Non-Buyout Backed IPO 
 
 
Value-Weighted 
Market-adj.  
Equal-Weighted 
Market-adj. 
Value-Weighted 
Market-adj.  
Equal-Weighted 
Market-adj. 
1980 -1.11 -1.82 -0.76 -1.47 
1981 0.78 0.42 0.37 0.01 
1982 3.12 2.81 0.50 0.19 
1983 1.99 0.95 -0.79 -1.83 
1984 -0.64 0.63 -1.32 -0.05 
1985 0.31 0.68 -0.81 -0.45 
1986 0.72 1.33 -0.79 -0.19 
1987 -0.09 0.71 -0.61 0.19 
1988 3.10 2.99 -0.19 -0.30 
1989 2.26 3.44 -1.24 -0.06 
1990 -0.24 1.27 0.03 1.54 
1991 2.01 0.93 -1.33 -2.42 
1992 0.97 -0.41 -0.21 -1.58 
1993 1.62 0.52 -0.49 -1.59 
1994 0.24 0.61 -0.13 0.24 
1995 0.37 0.71 -1.22 -0.88 
1996 0.27 0.46 -0.94 -0.74 
1997 0.75 1.42 -1.36 -0.69 
1998 1.19 3.06 -0.78 1.10 
1999 5.47 4.89 1.75 1.17 
2000 0.22 0.13 -2.63 -2.73 
2001 2.80 -0.09 1.13 -1.77 
2002 0.74 -0.28 -0.34 -1.35 
2003 0.84 -1.43 -1.75 -4.02 
2004 1.05 0.38 -0.88 -0.74 
2005 2.54 2.60 -0.63 -0.71 
Mean 1.29*** 1.03*** -0.59*** -0.76*** 
 
***= significant at the 1% confidence level; **=5%; *=10%. 
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Table 12. CAPM and Fama-French (1993) Three-Factor Regressions on Calendar-Time Portfolio   
Returns of RLBOs and Other IPOs. 
 
   Rpt-Rft=α+β (Rmt-Rft)+s SMBt+h HMLt+et 
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs and 5,706 other IPOs between January 1980 and December 
2002.  Portfolios of RLBOs and other IPOs are formed by including all issues that were done within 
three years. RMRF is the value weighted market return on all NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ firms (RM) 
minus the risk free rate (RF) that is the one-month Treasury bill rate. SMB (small minus big) is the 
difference each month between the return on small- and large-capitalization firms. HML (high minus 
low) is the difference each month between the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks 
and the return on a portfolio of low book-to-market stocks. Equal- and value-weighted IPO 
portfolios are formed at the IPO date or first available date for market values for IPOs. The robust t-
statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
 
 
 
 Buyout-Backed IPOs Non Buyout-Backed IPOs 
 CAPM Fama French Factor CAPM Fama French Factor 
 
 
Equal 
Weighted 
Value 
Weighted 
Equal 
Weighted 
Value 
Weighted 
Equal 
Weighted 
Value 
Weighted 
Equal 
Weighted 
Value 
Weighted 
Alpha 0.003 (1.30) 
0.010*** 
(3.40) 
0.001 
(0.64) 
0.010*** 
(4.58) 
-0.005* 
(1.83) 
-0.005*** 
(3.17) 
-0.003* 
(1.77) 
-0.003* 
(1.83) 
RMRF 1.35*** (22.54) 
1.28*** 
(19.54) 
1.29*** 
(20.01) 
1.17*** 
(14.85) 
1.38*** 
(22.32) 
0.91*** 
(23.52) 
1.11*** 
(23.01) 
0.69*** 
(20.09) 
SMB   0.75*** (6.16) 
0.67*** 
(7.46)   
1.01*** 
(16.24) 
0.37** 
(8.34) 
HML   0.17 (1.51) 
-0.007 
(0.06)   
-0.31*** 
(4.31) 
-0.46*** 
(9.00) 
Observations 310 308 310 308 312 312 312 312 
Adjusted R2 0.65 0.55 0.76 0.63 0.62 0.64 0.83 0.79 
 
***= significant at the 1% confidence level; **=5%; *=10%. 
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Table 13.  Multivariate Regression Analyses of RLBOs 
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs between January 1980 and December 2002.  The dependent 
variable is the natural logarithm of the three-year wealth relative (Wi,T =(1+Ri,T)/ ∑(1+RBench i,T), 
where the benchmark is the value-weighted buy-and-hold return of the market). The independent 
variables include the natural logarithm of the buyout firm’s capital under management and age at 
the RLBO date, a dummy variable denoting whether the chairman of the firm is from the buyout 
group, the percentage of board controlled by the buyout group, the buyout firm’s equity 
ownership after the firm’s IPO, the logarithm of the market capitalization after the IPO, the debt-
to total asset ratio after the IPO, and underwriter reputation. All variables except for the 
underwriter rank are computed using data from the quarter immediately after IPO or the end of 
the quarter of the IPO.  The second set of regressions has industry and year fixed effects. 
Absolute robust t-statistics are in parentheses.    
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Buyout Firm Age Before 
RLBO 
-0.008*** 
(2.73)  
-0.008** 
(2.40) 
-0.007** 
(2.08) 
-0.001 
(0.02)  
-0.001 
(0.32) 
-0.004 
(0.64) 
Logarithm of Buyout 
Firm Capital Before 
RLBO 
 -0.036 (1.03) 
-0.015 
(0.41) 
-0.023 
(0.43)  
0.074 
(1.52) 
0.077 
(1.54) 
0.175 
(2.16)** 
Chairman Dummy    -0.460** (2.24)    
-0.385 
(1.34) 
Buyout Presence in 
Board    
0.218 
(0.58)    
-0.422 
(0.55) 
Buyout Firm Ownership  
Before IPO    
0.315 
(0.97)    
-0.041 
(0.09) 
Logarithm of Market 
Cap shortly after IPO 
 
  -0.058 (0.67) 
 
  -0.026 (0.21) 
Debt/Asset Ratio  
shortly after IPO 
 
  0.632*** (2.77)  
 
 0.588 (1.41) 
Underwriter Reputation 
  
 -0.047  (0.70) 
 
 -0.088 (0.58) 
Intercept 
0.234*** 
(2.89) 
-0.123 
(0.53) 
-0.138 
(0.60) 
0.119 
(0.20)  
 
  
Observations 371 372 371 266 371 372 371 266 
R2 0.01 0.003 0.02 0.07 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.64 
Year Fixed  
Effects No No No 
 
No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Fixed  
Effects No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
***= significant at the 1% confidence level; **=5%; *=10%. 
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Figure 1. Distribution of Geometric Average Unadjusted Returns within Three Years 
after RLBO  
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs between January 1980 and December 2002. The 
figure shows the geometric average returns of RLBOs in the first through thirty-sixth 
month following the RLBOs. If the IPO is delisted before 36th month we calculate the 
geometric average return until the delisting date. The bar shows the geometric returns 
distribution of RLBOs and the line shows the normal distribution. 
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Figure 2. Average Monthly Market-Adjusted Return by Year t after the RLBO  
 
The sample consists of 496 RLBOs between January 1980 and December 2002. The 
figure shows the average excess return of RLBOs in the first through fifth years 
following the RLBOs. The portfolios are rebalanced monthly. The benchmark portfolio is 
S&P 500 Index in Panels A and B; and the matched size and book-to-market portfolio in 
Panels C and D. The value-weighted returns in Panels B and D are formed using the 
market value of the firm at the end of the quarter of its IPO. 
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Panel C 
-0.40%
-0.20%
0.00%
0.20%
0.40%
0.60%
0.80%
1 2 3 4 5
Excess return (EW) adjusted by the Size and B/M Portfolio
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